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HungaryABSTRACT ■ This article examines printing trade unions in the Czech Republic,
Slovakia and Hungary. Since 1990 they have been under major pressure from
financial difficulties resulting from a dramatic fall in membership. This, in turn,
stemmed from the hostile environment of privatization, corporate mergers and
acquisitions, technological change and anti-trade union policies on the part of
some employers. To reduce costs and ensure institutional survival, and poten-
tially revival, the leaderships of the three unions have implemented strategies to
redefine union objectives, the means of their achievement and the procedures
of union democracy. Modernization is, however, constrained by their unions’
decision-making structures, cultures, resources and their own ideologies.
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I begin by analysing the political, economic, technological and industrial
relations environment in which the three unions have operated over the past
15 years, then consider the impact of a hostile environment on their mem-
bership and compare their experiences with trade unions in other sectors in
the three countries. Using a qualified contingency model of change I then
analyse the impact of declining membership on strategic choices made by
the leaderships of the three unions to ensure their institutional survival and
revival. I explore similarities and differences in the strategies adopted by the
three leaderships, and conclude by considering the future prospects for the
three unions.
The Printing Unions
Typografická beseda (TB, Typographical Circle) was created in 1862 by
print workers in the Czech part of the Austro-Hungarian empire (Kraus,
2000; Slomp, 1994). Under the German (1939–45) and Soviet (1948–89)
occupations, the union was dissolved;1 printers in postwar Czechoslovakia
were members of the Union of Workers of the Chemical, Paper, Glass and
Printing Industries. Typografická beseda was reconstituted in January
1990; it has 36 workplace branches whilst its 11-person national executive
is elected at a quadrennial congress, the supreme policymaking body.
Slovensky´ odborovy´ zväz pracovníkov poligrafie (SOZPP, Slovak
Graphical Trade Union) was reconstituted in March 1990. It has eight
workplace branches and its eight-person national executive meets quarter-
ly, but the supreme policymaking body is the four-yearly congress. Its
president (previously the personnel director in Bratislava for the Pravda
newspaper) is the only full-time officer.
The Hungarian Nyomdaipari Dolgozók Szakszervezete (NDSz,
Graphical Workers’ Union), formed in 1864, was dissolved under the com-
munists when print workers became members of the Hungarian Paper,
Press and Publishing Trade Union.2 In 1989 the union was reconstituted. It
has 50 workplace branches and a nine-person executive committee elected
by a General Assembly which oversees financial and collective bargaining
matters. Its quadrennial congress is the supreme policymaking body.
Analytical Framework
The analytical framework used is the qualified contingency model of change
(Undy et al., 1996). This places a union at the centre of a web of pressures for
change, interpreted through an amended version of the concepts of
representative and administrative rationality proposed by Child et al. (1973).
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The model recognizes that union leaders make strategic choices within
constraints imposed by the external and internal environments in which
their union operates. The leaders evaluate the importance of the various
pressures and act accordingly.
The political, economic, and technological contexts of a trade union
influence its membership levels. An unfavourable economic environment
depresses demand and unemployment rises, hence union membership
will probably fall. If the average size of the employing unit falls then
union membership is also likely to decline, as it is more costly to organ-
ize one person in a hundred different workplaces than 100 people in one
workplace.
If government deregulates labour and product markets then competitive
forces intensify, causing downward pressures on employment conditions
and eventually the need for redundancies. The resulting unemployment
increases the likelihood that union membership will fall. The implementa-
tion of new technology substitutes labour for capital, reducing the amount
of labour employed; technological change may also alter the distribution
of employment from unionized to non-unionized jobs.
In responding to declining membership, union leaders can exercise
strategic choices. In doing so they are likely to be constrained by factors
such as the union’s governance system, its resources and its culture.
Leadership strategic choices can be interpreted through a rationalities
framework (see Figure 1). By strategic choice, it is not meant that leader-
ships adopt an integrated set of policies, but that they respond to identified
pressures on their union.
Political rationality denotes the purpose of the union and its means of
achieving that purpose. A union leadership may react to declining mem-
bership in a number of ways. It might change its objectives from those of
‘business unionism’ (improving its members’ sectional interests within the
existing social system) to ‘reformist unionism’ (seeking social change to
enhance the interests of its members and other social groups) (Dabscheck
and Niland, 1981). On the other hand, the leadership may keep the union’s
objectives unchanged but seek new means to achieve them: for example,
by launching an organizing campaign. A third option may be to seek
merger with another union. A further choice might be to change from
adversarial to cooperative behaviour in collective bargaining. Typically,
leaderships adopt a combination of these possible strategic responses.
Democratic rationality denotes the union’s notions of democracy and
its associated governmental systems, at both workplace and national lev-
els. In response to membership loss and resulting financial difficulties, a
union leadership may introduce greater centralization to exercise more
control over expenditure. Alternatively, they might merge branches and
reduce the amount of money held at branch level. In some unions,
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choice of a centralization strategy may be constrained by jealously
guarded branch autonomy. Another choice for a union leadership could
be to reduce the number of layers of union government, perhaps remov-
ing the regional or district level. Again, a combination of these possible
options is likely.
Administrative rationality denotes the procedures designed to ensure
effective management. Declining membership makes cost-cutting a central
concern for union leaderships. Within cultural, political and resource
constraints many options are available to reduce expenditure and to gain
additional income. They can reduce the frequency of committee meetings,
cut the number of employees and officers, renegotiate debts and sell prop-
erty and investments. A further option might be to implement cost control
and budgetary planning procedures. When reacting to adverse pressures,
Effect on Union Membership
Political Democratic Administrative
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FIGURE 1. Qualified Contingency Model
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the leadership will be concerned with the impact of their action on all three
rationalities.
Data Collection
This article is based on information collected between 2000 and 2004,
when the author was Programme Director of each of the three unions’
annual industrial relations skills training courses for branch officers,
executive committee members and national officers. At each seminar, a
three-hour semi-structured interview was conducted with the president,
vice-presidents and executive committee members (who were also branch
secretaries and shop stewards). The interviews covered the structure of
the industry, changes in the unions’ governance and financial systems,
their affiliation to wider labour organizations, their relationships with
employers and the actions of the leadership to maintain organizational
viability. In addition, two-hour interviews were conducted with each of
the presidents at annual meetings of UNI-Europa Graphical. In total, 30
interviews were conducted over the five-year period. The author was
accompanied on each occasion by the same interpreter.
The Hostile Environment
Since 1989 the three unions have operated in a hostile environment. First,
governments in the three countries – regardless of party composition3 –
have given priority to privatization and liberalization. A market economy
was established by privatization, ending state subsidies and price controls
and exposing domestic markets to international competition (Pollert and
Hradecka, 1994). The labour market was also liberalized by dismantling
social safety nets and weakening statutory employment rights.
Relationships between central government and the trade union move-
ment were thus often difficult. In Slovakia they were particularly strained
under the right-wing coalition elected in 2002. Its economic, social and
welfare reforms had a negative effect on standards of living, and trade
union criticism culminated in organizing a petition for a referendum on
holding an early parliamentary election.4 The government reacted by dis-
continuing the national forum for tripartite social dialogue.
The Hungarian trade union movement faced difficulties under the con-
servative coalition of Viktor Orbán, which abandoned social dialogue,
abolished the self-government of social insurance and amended the
Labour Code without prior consultation with the unions. The general
election of 2002 saw the formation of a socialist–liberal coalition which
has proved more sympathetic on welfare issues, re-established the
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Council for Interest Reconciliation and supported the establishment of
sectoral social dialogue committees (see below).
Restructuring has created a more hostile economic environment. The
privatization of the Czech printing industry was completed by 1995, in
Hungary by 1997 and in Slovakia by 1999. Privatization transformed
the industry’s structure (PIRA, 1998). Before 1990, each country had a
small number of large state-owned enterprises employing typically
1500 workers producing the full range of printing products under one
roof. The former Czechoslovakia had 17 such printing houses and
Hungary 32 (Simpson, 1992). Privatization resulted in a small number
of large printing enterprises co-existing with a large number of small
printing establishments specializing in niche markets (Intergraf, 2004).
In Hungary there are now 4000 printing enterprises with on average
eight employees; in Slovakia, 500 enterprises with on average six
employees; in the Czech Republic, 2800 firms with on average five
employees. This fragmented industry structure makes organizing print
workers far more difficult.
Privatization has also changed ownership patterns. Small general print
firms remain domestically owned. The larger firms are foreign-owned;
for example, the Hungarian Révai group is now owned by the UK multi-
national Polestar. In the Czech Republic, German-owned companies
control 80 percent of both the national and regional newspaper market,
whilst in Hungary the figure is over 90 percent (UEG, 2005a).
A third challenge stems from technical change. At the start of the pri-
vatization process, the industry’s technology was outdated: in each
country, letterpress was the dominant printing process, though this had
ceased to be the case in western Europe in the early 1960s. Privatization
and foreign investment brought the advanced printing technologies of
western Europe, with a significant impact on employment and skill
levels (Allnut, 2003). In each country craft skills such as typesetting dis-
appeared, as letterpress was replaced by lithographic, gravure and digital
printing processes. Its impact was summed up by the President of
Typografická beseda:
the switch from outdated techniques and the advent of new printing tech-
niques meant a 30 to 40 percent reduction in the number of workers. The
desktop revolution hit printing companies as western groups invested in
the publishing industry and brought the latest technology with them.
Privatization brought unemployment and re-training needs for graphical
workers. (Interview, November 2002)
Finally, in each country some print employers took advantage of the
changed environment to avoid union recognition. Recognition problems
were most common in foreign-owned enterprises; in general, the own-
ers of small printing companies were happy to recognize the union and
European Journal of Industrial Relations 13(1)
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to engage, through membership of an employers’ association, in sectoral
collective bargaining. Many of these owners, as in western Europe, had
themselves previously been skilled print workers. This contrasts with
other sectors where small and medium enterprises have been infertile
recruitment grounds for trade unions (Cox and Mason, 2000). Many
privatized printing company owners had, in the communist era, been
directors of state-owned enterprises; but some now oppose trade
unions. Some printing employers discriminate directly against trade
union members by offering them smaller pay rises than non-unionists,
refusing them training opportunities, overlooking them for promotion
and in some cases by dismissal from employment. Trade union work-
place representatives frequently experience difficulties of line managers
refusing to release them from work to undertake union activities.
Membership Levels
The hostile environment has resulted in substantial membership decline
(see Table 1). The data are taken from each union’s membership records.
The working membership of Typografická beseda (Czech Republic) fell
between 1990 and 2004 by 92 percent; that of SOZPP (Slovakia) by 95
percent; that of NDSz (Hungary) by 87 percent. In each country, the
sharpest decline occurred between 1990 and 1995, the period of most
rapid privatization. In 1990, in all three countries, union density in the
printing industry exceeded 90 percent. By 2004, it had fallen to 25 per-
cent in the Czech Republic, 10 percent in Slovakia and 30 percent in
Hungary.
Membership has held up relatively better for the Hungarian union than
for the other two print unions for three main reasons. First, the loss of jobs
and the level of unemployment have been less: in 1996–8 the average level
of unemployment for the Hungarian printing industry was five percent,
compared to eight percent in the Czech Republic and 12–15 percent in
Slovakia (PIRA, 1998). Second, the major foreign investor in the
Hungarian printing industry, Polestar, has had a more favourable attitude
to union membership than foreign investors in the Czech Republic and
Slovakia. Third, the introduction in 1992 in Hungary of works councils
provided NDSz with a springboard for organization that was not available
to SOZPP and Typografiká beseda.
These rates of membership decline are more severe than for other
unions in these countries. Membership affiliated to the main peak organ-
izations in the Czech Republic (CˇMKOS), Slovakia (KOZSR) and
Hungary (MSzOSz) fell in the same period by 62, 79 and 66 percent
respectively. The largest industrial union in these countries, the Metal
Workers, lost 65, 78 and 70 percent respectively. In the Czech Republic, the
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Trade Union of Workers in Wood Processing, Forests and Water
Supplies lost 83 percent of its membership,5 while its counterpart in
Slovakia (OZDLV) lost 80 percent. Though all unions have suffered
serious losses, those in printing have been exceptional.
Union Leadership Strategies
Applying the earlier distinction between ‘business’ and ‘reformist’ union-
ism, all three unions have adopted both business objectives with collective
bargaining their core means to further members’ interests, and reformist
objectives though affiliation to wider trade union bodies and support for
political parties they believe best represent trade union interests.
Bargaining Strategy and Sectoral Organization
In all three countries, the main locus of collective bargaining in the printing
industry is the workplace, although all three unions are parties to sectoral
agreements. Their approach to bargaining at both levels is pragmatic. All
three presidents consider an adversarial bargaining strategy is unrealistic:
they cannot apply effective sanctions during negotiations, for members fear
that industrial action will cost them their jobs. Their bargaining strategy is
to cooperate with employers and gain whatever improvements they can.
On occasions at sectoral level, this has meant a bargained wage increase no
more than that in the statutory minimum wage (UEG, 2003, 2004).
TABLE 1. Working Membership of Graphical Unions in the Czech Republic,
Slovakia and Hungary
TB SOZPP NDSz
1990 20,000 11,000 15,000
1993 17,250 7380 14,400
1994 6123 5500 12,798
1995 5246 3500 10,000
1996 4781 3048 7000
1997 3500 1914 6815
1998 2500 1500 6815
1999 2221 1030 6815
2000 2121 1000 5320
2001 2000 900 4500
2002 2000 800 3000
2003 1800 600 2700
2004 1600 500 2014
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Their bargaining strategy is also constrained by insufficient resources to
meet the training needs of their representatives in the basic industrial rela-
tions skills required to handle competently employee grievances,
disciplinary matters, redundancies and negotiations. Such skills were
unnecessary during the communist period, when collective bargaining in
its western sense was unknown. Since the early 1990s the unions have
received assistance from their western counterparts through the European
Graphical Federation (EGF), which in 2000 became the Graphical Section
of UNI-Europa (UEG). For example, the British Graphic Paper & Media
Union (GPMU) ‘adopted’ Typografická beseda, SOZPP and NDSz, pro-
viding finance for industrial relations skills training programmes and
‘training the trainer’ seminars. From 2000 it provided supplementary funds
from a grant received under the EU Commission PHARE Programme.
Over the period 1996–2005, over 250 representatives from the three unions
received regular training in industrial relations skills (UEG, 2005b).
The coverage of the sectoral agreement in all three countries is low. In
the Czech Republic, the employers’ organization – the Union of
Graphical Entrepreneurs – has 57 member firms from a potential of 2800;
only 11 are signatories to the sectoral agreement. The Slovak employers’
association – the Union of Printers in Slovakia – has 64 member com-
panies out of a potential 500, and only eight operate the sector agreement.
In Hungary, the employers’ national body – the Professional Association
of Printers – has 200 members out of a possible 4000 but only six apply
the sectoral agreement.
All three union leaderships believe it essential for their survival strat-
egy that appropriate machinery be established at sectoral level in which
meaningful consultation and bargaining can occur. However, in Slovakia
and the Czech Republic there have been no attempts to create a sector
committee for the graphical industry, since both the union and its
employer counterpart remain too weak to establish such a body. In
Hungary, the National Interest Reconciliation Council established a
Sectoral Social Dialogue Centre in August 2004, financed from the state
budget to support and coordinate the work of sectoral committees. To
date, 32 such committees have been established but negotiations to create
one for the printing industry are proceeding slowly. For the union, this
would be an important step towards establishing minimum industry-
wide standards which could then be enhanced by workplace bargaining;
but the employers want to restrict any committee to information and
consultation and to political lobbying on sector-specific issues.
International and National Affiliations
International affiliations might be regarded as evidence of a ‘reformist’
orientation. In 1991, all three unions affiliated to the International
Gennard: Managing Membership Decline in a Hostile Environment
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Graphical Federation (IGF) and the EGF. These affiliations provided
access to resources for industrial relations training, for information and
for political lobbying of the European Commission and the European
Parliament and for influence within the European Trade Union
Confederation (ETUC).6
There are differences, explained by the ideology of the leaderships, in
their strategic choices of affiliation to national trade union centres and
support for ‘left-wing’ political parties. Since 1990, SOZPP has had only
one president and the NDSz two. All three individuals regarded affiliation
to a national trade union centre as important for demonstrating solidarity
with other groups of employees. The leadership of NDSz has been a loyal
supporter of the (ex-communist) Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) and is
regarded as a ‘left-wing’ union. Andreas Barsony, its President from 1989
to 2002, was heavily involved in MSzP affairs and was elected as one of its
parliamentary candidates in the 1998 general election. In 2002, he resigned
as the union’s president on appointment to the post of Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs in the socialist–liberal coalition government. His suc-
cessor has continued the union’s support for the Socialist Party but gives
greater priority to the general management of the union. The NDSz is a
member of the largest of the rival peak union organizations, the (reformed
former communist) MSzOSz (National Association of Hungarian Trade
Unions), which has close links with the MSzP.
SOZPP was a prime mover in the creation in 1990 of the Czech and
Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions (CˇSKOS) and has been a mem-
ber of the Trade Union Confederation of the Slovak Republic (KOZ SR)
since the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1993. In Slovakia, a problem for
all trade unions is the absence of a political party with sympathies
towards the labour movement. The unions have played an important
role in organizing protests against the government’s economic and social
policies and, as noted above, initiated a campaign in 2004 for a referen-
dum to trigger an early election. SOZPP members have been heavily
involved in these protest actions.
The position in the Czech Republic is very different. Since 1990,
Typografická beseda has had two presidents; both are anti-communist and
perceive left-wing Czech parties as still communist-controlled. Since the
‘velvet revolution’, the union has consistently supported ‘free market’ eco-
nomics and aligned itself with ‘right-wing’ political parties. Its former
president was appointed advisor to the ultra-liberal Klaus government on
the privatization of the Czech printing industry. Typografická beseda
resigned from CˇSKOS in 1996, arguing the union was too small to influ-
ence the Confederation decision-making bodies which were dominated by
its four largest unions. It also alleged that the Confederation was too close-
ly aligned to social-democratic political parties and that its president had
been connected with the secret police during the communist era.
European Journal of Industrial Relations 13(1)
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Membership Recruitment and Retention
The leaderships of all three unions acknowledge that central to their sur-
vival strategy is the need to recruit new members and to retain existing
ones. If successful, the unions will gain significant additional resources.
Trade unions have adopted two broad approaches to the recruitment,
organization and retention of members: the servicing and the organizing
models (Bronfenbrenner et al., 1998; Conrow, 1991). The former stress-
es that full-time union officials, rather than workplace representatives,
provide support to members when they encounter problems with the
employer. Financial and legal services are used to attract and retain mem-
bers. Underpinning the organizing model is that over the long term at
least, workplace organization becomes self-sufficient through increased
membership participation at all levels of the union. Central resources can
therefore be redirected towards recruitment.
In the printing industries of the three countries, a servicing model is
scarcely an option because of the decentralization of collective bargain-
ing, the growth of small employing units and the absence of the union
from many workplaces. The unions have insufficient full-time officials to
service the expanding number of employing and collective bargaining
units. They have attempted to implement the organizing model, for
example through the provision of industrial relations skills training.
The national leaderships are however constrained in implementing an
organizing model by the lack of union presence in many workplaces and
by the strength of branch autonomy. Although all three unions have 80
percent density in some workplaces, membership is weak or non-existent
in the vast majority. SOZPP has no members in any printing establish-
ment in Bratislava, the Slovak capital and the largest printing centre in the
country. Typografická besada has no presence in three-quarters of Czech
printing plants. NDSz membership density is under 10 percent in the
overwhelming majority of printing establishments. All three unions lack
the resources to employ organizers.
As is traditional in printing trade unionism in most countries, the
branches of all three unions have industrial and financial autonomy
from the centre and retain a significant proportion of the membership
fees. The national organization cannot interfere with branch decisions
unless they are contrary to national union policy. In addition, it does not
control the work of the branch officers who determine their own prior-
ities. The national leadership can only advise branches to assign the
highest priority to membership recruitment. A minority of branches
accepted this advice but experienced little success in the face of employee
apathy, employer anti-union policies, the tendency among highly skilled
print workers to engage in informal collective bargaining and employee
perceptions that the union cannot protect them from the arbitrary
Gennard: Managing Membership Decline in a Hostile Environment
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behaviour of employers. The national organizations, starved of financial
and staff resources, do not have the means to mount an effective mem-
bership and recruitment campaign.
Mergers
Mergers between trade unions can give rise to economies of scale and to a
more efficient deployment of limited resources. For example, only one
research department is required instead of two. Mergers permit the
concentration of resources and may thereby facilitate a membership
recruitment campaign, for example. Merger as a survival strategy was ini-
tially rejected by all three union leaderships. They considered it impossible
to ‘sell’ to their members, while to impose it from above would cause
members to ‘vote with their feet’. Membership opposition was based in
part on experience during the communist period, when the official trade
union structure was based on large industry (or multi-industry) federa-
tions within the central confederation. As a small part of an organization
with a highly diverse occupational membership, printers felt they had been
‘dispossessed’ of their union.7 Their autonomy and identity as printers had
been swamped by the other, numerically larger groups with whom they
felt no industrial affinity, and they were too small to influence the decision-
making bodies. The leaderships of the three unions understood that their
members feared that merger with another union would merely replicate
these past problems. Having just regained their status as an autonomous
printing trade union there was little stomach for merger.
Today, the print unions in the Czech Republic and Slovakia remain as
strongly opposed to merger. SOZPP has rejected overtures from the Trade
Union of Workers in Wood Processing, Forest and Water Management in
Slovakia (28,136 members), even though that union offers to establish a
separate print section and to make its head a vice-president of the union.
It also reacted negatively to enquiries from the journalists and the metal-
workers about a possible merger. The anti-merger policy was reconfirmed
at its 2003 congress. The 2004 Congress of Typografická beseda took the
same decision. Its position was summarized by their President:
Typografická beseda has no plans for merger. Experience of being part of
a larger trade union under the former regime was not pleasant for print-
ers. We had no influence, our democratic traditions were disliked and we
felt isolated. Enough is enough. The members will not support a merger.
If one took place they would vote with their feet.
By contrast, however, the leadership and membership of NDSz changed
their attitude to merger. By 2002, they had concluded that the fragmenta-
tion of trade unions in Hungary which occurred after 1990 was a major
source of weakness. In contrast to the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where
European Journal of Industrial Relations 13(1)
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only one central union confederation exists, there are six competing ‘main’
Hungarian confederations. The movement consists of a multitude of small
and medium-sized unions lacking resources and with haemorrhaging mem-
bership, unable to act as an effective countervailing force to employers and
national governments.
The NDSz began in late 2002 to take the possibility of merger seriously
and to think about possible partners (interview, November 2004). In
October 2004 it signed a Declaration committing eight unions to merge.
The unions, all affiliated to MSzOSz, organize workers in paper-making,
printing, energy, metalworking, clothing, leather, chemicals and coal min-
ing. The intention is to create a union with eight autonomous sectors each
retaining their existing identity, systems of government and collective
agreements. Across this vertical structure the central union will collect all
the membership fees, from which appropriate funds will allocated to each
sector. It will also provide common services to sectors, such as membership
recruitment campaigns, research facilities and political lobbying. The
Declaration was approved at the union’s 2004 Congress and merger talks
are continuing.
Democratic Rationality
In responding to declining membership, the three unions rejected attempts
to reduce the number of branches by merger or to remove any layers of
government. Their governmental system of branch, national executive,
congress and elected full-time officers remained as agreed at their 1990
reconstitution conferences. The autonomy of the branches remained as
strong as in 1990. But two of the unions attempted to revise their demo-
cratic procedures by changing their financial governance to provide more
resources for the national organization. Initially, members of Typografická
beseda had paid a monthly contribution of two percent of net pay, all of
which went to the national union which then distributed funds to branches
in accordance to their needs. Its 1994 congress then agreed that in the
future the two percent be paid to the branch, which would then forward
30 kcˇ (about €1) per month per member to the national organization. This
change in financial governance threatened the national organization of
Typografická beseda with collapse. However, the leadership failed to per-
suade the union’s 1998 and 2002 congresses to increase the contribution to
the national organization to 60 kcˇ.
In NDSz the membership subscription is one percent of gross monthly
pay, of which the national organization receives 40 percent. In the face of
increasing financial problems, the national executive proposed unsuccess-
fully to the 1998 congress that the subscription rate be raised to 1.5 percent
with the additional income allocated to strengthening the national organ-
ization. The 2003 congress, however, agreed, for one year only, that the
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proportion of the contribution retained by the branch be reduced and the
resources released be allocated to the national organization as a one-off
solution to its financial problems.
In SOZPP, the leadership strategy was to resist attempts by the
branches to retain a higher percentage of the membership contribution.
The 1990 congress had agreed that the membership fee be split 50/50
between the branch and the national organization; but some branches
wanted a 70/30 split in their favour. The resulting tensions split the
union. In 1992, one branch with 500 members disaffiliated from the
national union over the issue. In the following year, two branches were
expelled when they stopped paying the 50 percent of the contribution 
fee to the national union; the national leadership had little option but to
expel the branches even though this action would reduce by over 1000 an
already sharply declining membership, since otherwise more branches
would have opted not to forward the 50 percent.
The national union leaderships saw their strategy of strengthening the
national organization by receiving a higher proportion of the monthly
subscriptions resisted by the branches, which wished to preserve the
existing decentralized government system in which they determine their
own industrial priorities and decide how their funds can best be spent in
the interests of their members. The branches wished to maintain a rela-
tively weak national organization offering basic services which the
branches could decide whether or not to use. The branches feared that
strengthening the national organization would enhance its control over
them and be a threat to their jealously guarded autonomy. They also
feared that a strong central organization would repeat the experience of
the communism era, when the national leaders of the trade unions were
viewed as corrupt and immune from democratic control. This distrust of
a central organization has still not disappeared.
Administrative Rationality
When the attempt to persuade their members to change the financial gov-
ernance of their unions failed, the leaderships gave even greater priority
to controlling and reducing administrative costs. Under the communist
era, the unions owned substantial assets such as holiday homes, hotels,
health spas as well as office buildings. After the regime change, the three
print unions were allocated shares in these properties by the national
trade union centre, in proportion to their membership. The presidents of
Typografická beseda and SOZPP sold the shares in hotels and holiday
homes to overseas investors. The NDSz leadership sold their resort centre
in Budapest, and rented empty office space in their headquarters to com-
mercial organizations. The income was invested and the ensuing interest
used to fund national expenditure.
European Journal of Industrial Relations 13(1)
102
089-108 EJD-073969.qxd  3/2/07  4:28 PM  Page 102
All three unions implemented various cost-cutting measures. The size of
the national executive committee of each union was progressively reduced:
in Typografická beseda, from 17 in 1990 to 14 in 1995 and 11 in 2004. The
corresponding figures for the Slovak union were 27, 10 and eight; and for
the NDSz 18, 12 and nine. Although the national executive committees
became smaller, there was continuity of membership: in all three unions, 60
percent of the individuals serving on the executive committee in 2004 had
been members in 1990.
Cost cutting also involved reducing the number, and changing the
employment status, of paid officials and employees. In 1998, Typografická
beseda made its two vice-presidents part-time. The 2003 congress of NDSz
voted to replace its resigning full-time president by a part-time successor.
In 1998, the union had a full-time staff of 14 people; today, it employs
only five. Typografická beseda has reduced its national employees from 10
to two, whilst the SOZPP now only has one full-time employee – its pres-
ident – who has no administrative or secretarial support. Five years ago it
employed six people.
As the financial position of the three unions deteriorated, they experi-
enced difficulties in paying their affiliation fees to their international
organizations. There was a serious risk of expulsion, which would have
been a threat to their survival, for affiliation brought access to financial
resources. In 2002 the leaders of the three unions negotiated with UNI a
rescheduling of the payment of unpaid affiliation fees: all were permitted
for the foreseeable future to continue in membership in return for the
payment of an affiliation fee based on a ‘notional’ level of membership.8
The NDSz experienced similar difficulties at national level: in 2002 to
avoid expulsion from MSzOSz it had to persuade the confederation to
write off half of its unpaid affiliation fees.
Conclusions
Since 1990, the pressures for change affecting the printing unions in the
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary have come from financial diffi-
culties resulting from a dramatic decline in their membership. This, in
turn, stemmed from the hostile environment of privatization, company
mergers, technological change and anti-trade union policies on the part
of some printing employers. The strategic response of the leaders to
secure the survival of their unions has been contingent on these factors
and has been analysed in this article with reference to political, demo-
cratic and administrative rationalities. Their responses were constrained
by internal considerations such as each union’s decision-making struc-
tures, its culture, the lack of organizational resources and the ideologies
(political bias) of the leaders.
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Over the past 15 years, the political rationality of the three unions
remained unchanged. On their reconstitution in 1990 they adopted ele-
ments of both business and reformist trade unionism. The former is seen
in the importance they assign to collective bargaining as the main vehi-
cle for the protection and improvement of their members’ employment
conditions. The latter is seen in their affiliation to wider trade union
bodies and support for political parties they regard as best able to
advance their members’ interests while having the potential of getting
into government. There has been no movement in any of the three
unions to abandon these elements of business and reformist unionism.
At the sectoral level in their collective bargaining relationship with
employers the leaders of the three unions have adopted a pragmatic and
opportunist approach, preferring cooperation to adversarialism. This
approach is explained by their recognition that the relative balance of
bargaining power favoured the print employers and was unlikely to
change in the near future.
The leaderships of all three unions acknowledge the importance of an
effective membership recruitment and retention strategy if their unions
are to survive and grow in industrial influence. They have sought, where
possible, to implement the organizing model of membership recruit-
ment, for example by providing industrial relations skills training
programmes. They are, however, constrained by the extent of branch
autonomy. Branches retain the bulk of the members’ subscriptions,
determine their own industrial priorities and resist any interference in
their affairs by the national leadership. Union leaders have no powers to
oblige branches to give priority to the recruitment and retention of
members.
The means used to achieve the union’s political strategies differed in
important respects depending on the leadership ideologies. The leaders of
SOZPP and the NDSz see affiliation to a national trade union centre as an
expression of solidarity with the interests of other workers as well as their
own. They are also supportive of the left-wing political parties. The lead-
ership of Typografická beseda, on the other hand, supports right-wing
parties and views their ‘left-wing’ rivals as still tainted by communism. In
1996, they disaffiliated from CˇMKOS on the grounds, inter alia, that it
was too closely aligned with the political left.
Differences also exist with regard to merger with other unions. The lead-
erships of the Czech and Slovak print union remain ideologically opposed
to mergers. Their attitude reflects experience of being part of an occupa-
tionally heterogeneous union during the communist period, when they felt
isolated and unable to influence decision-making. For a decade the leader-
ship of NDSz held similar attitudes, but in 2002 they concluded that the
fragmentation of the Hungarian trade union movement was a cause of their
declining influence with employees, employers and national governments.
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The leadership has thus changed its strategy for survival and growth to
support for merger.
The democratic rationality of the three unions remained unchanged.
No layers of government have been removed. The industrial and financial
autonomy of the branches remains; the national leaderships have failed 
to persuade their members of the benefits of a well-resourced national
organization. For all three unions, the dominant need from the mid-1990s
was to address their financial difficulties. As a result, the national leader-
ships gave administrative rationality the highest priority. They have
attempted to cut the expenditure of the national organization, for example
by reducing the size and the frequency of the meetings of the national
executive. The administrative adjustments made by each union have tend-
ed to be made as and when the need arises, rather than on the basis of an
integrated strategic approach.
What of future prospects? Is it a matter of continuing to manage decline,
or can resources be found to enable decline to be reversed and revival begin?
To continue managing membership decline is not a longer-term option for
any of the three unions. Further loss of membership, the ensuing increased
financial deficits and the continuing reluctance of the members to pay
increased subscriptions means the three unions will continue to lack the
resources to be effective interest representation organizations. Eventually,
the point will be reached when the only choice will be either dissolution or
amalgamation with another union, but with no ability to shape the terms
upon which this takes place.
The revival of the three print unions as effective representative organiza-
tions requires an increase in their membership. This, in turn, necessitates
investing in a membership reorganization, recruitment and retention cam-
paign. Finding additional resources for this activity is paramount. Graphical
unions in western Europe are also faced by declining membership. In most
countries the response has been to merge with a large non-print union with-
in which they nevertheless retain their occupational identity. Through such
a merger they hope to achieve economies of scale, a more efficient deploy-
ment of limited resources, providing better services to members and a solid
foundation for membership growth. Amalgamations along these lines have
been concluded in the past four years by the print unions in Germany,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK. In Sweden and Finland the
print union has also decided to go down this path. It is too early to say
whether this consolidation will prove successful in realizing the resources
necessary to run a successful recruitment campaign and hence reverse
membership decline. What, however, is more certain is that without such
mergers the possibility of doing so would be slim. For the same reasons as
print unions in western Europe, those of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and
Hungary need to consider following the same route. The alternative is likely
to be a slow and painful death.
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1 However, it is claimed the union continued to operate ‘underground’ through
after-work meetings in beer parlours (interview with Vladimir Petrus,
President of Typographická beseda 1990–94, 11 November 2002). Lipset et al.
(1956: 71) report in a footnote of their classic study that printers in Leipzig
similarly maintained their ‘union’ underground in the Nazi period.
2 It is likewise claimed that Hungarian print workers maintained their original
organization underground (interviews with former and present presidents,
March 1996 and October 2002).
3 Each country has had four general elections since 1989. The governing
coalitions have tended to alternate between (centre) right and (centre) left.
4 The President of the country agreed to hold a referendum, which took place
in May 2004. Almost 90 percent of those voting were in favour of early elec-
tions, but because the turnout was under 50 percent the result was invalid.
5 This union, like its Slovak counterpart, organizes workers employed in
paper-making and furniture manufacture. In 2000 the paper-making section
broke away, but its membership has been included in this calculation.
6 The Hungarian Graphical Workers’ Union had been present at the founda-
tion meeting of the International Printers’ Secretariat in Paris in 1889, and
subsequently played an active part in its affairs (Otto, 1991).
7 This feeling of dispossession was noted in the communist period by Lowit
(1982). It was an important factor in the fragmentation (especially amongst
skilled manual workers) of trade unionism in central and eastern Europe
soon after the fall of communism.
8 Such an arrangement is commonly adopted by international trade union
organizations when affiliates are in serious financial difficulties.REFERENCES
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